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Abstract
This doctoral thesis is a collection of four essays in public economics that
look at various public policies and their impacts on low-income and otherwise
vulnerable individuals. The essays share the general aim of studying the
effectiveness of public policies in achieving their stated goals. The first essay
is single-authored by the candidate, and the latter three are collaborations
with one or more co-authors.
In the first essay, I use a unique dataset compiled from Finnish registers and
surveys to provide a comprehensive characterisation of the take-up behaviour
of Finnish welfare benefits (housing allowance and social assistance) using
descriptive methods. I provide various stylised facts on take-up and discuss
how income dynamics matter for understanding take-up and benefit targeting.
The second essay focuses on the impact of information on benefit take-
up. We study the information campaign in the context of the introduction of
the guarantee pension program in Finland in 2011 and find that receiving a
mailed information letter and application form significantly increased take-up
compared to non-recipients.
In the the third essay, we analyse the impact of employers’ disability in-
surance (DI) contributions on the incidence of disability pensions among their
workers. Experience rating is used in DI in Finland in order to increase em-
ployers’ incentives to prevent disabilities among their workers. We use detailed
data and an empirical strategy that allows us to identify the causal effect of
experience rating on disability inflow. Our analysis finds that the policy is
not effective in reducing disabilities.
The fourth essay uses a theoretical framework to provide optimal tax and
transfer rules for poverty reduction in developing countries. We modify the
standard optimal tax framework by restricting tax instruments to be linear,
which are more feasibly implemented in countries with a lower administrative
capacity. We show that when we change from the standard objective of wel-
fare maximisation to that of poverty minimisation, which better depicts the
concrete objectives of such countries, the optimal tax and transfer rules are
changed.
i
  
Tiivistelmä
Tämä väitöskirja koostuu neljästä julkistaloustieteen alaan kuuluvasta es-
seestä, jotka käsittelevät erinäisiä politiikkainstrumentteja ja niiden vaikutuk-
sia pienituloisiin ja muilla tavoin haavoittuviin yksilöihin. Esseiden tavoite on
vastata kysymykseen, kuinka hyvin nämä politiikkainstrumentit saavuttavat
niiden eksplisiittiset tavoitteet. Ensimmäinen essee on väittelijän yksin kir-
joittama, muut kolme on kirjoitettu yhteistyössä eri kirjoittajien kanssa.
Ensimmäisessä esseessä luon laajan katsauksen suomalaisten viimesijais-
ten sosiaalietuuksien, asumistuen ja toimeentulotuen, alikäyttöön. Esseessä
käytetään kuvailevia menetelmiä yhdessä ainutlaatuisen, eri rekisteriaineis-
toista kootun aineiston kanssa. Muodostan niiden avulla useita tyyliteltyjä
faktoja alikäytöstä ja tutkin, miten kohderyhmän tulodynamiikka vaikuttaa
alikäyttöön ja tukien kohdentumiseen.
Toinen essee käsittelee informaation vaikutusta tukien alikäyttöön. Tut-
kimme suomalaisen takuueläkkeen voimaantulon yhteydessä vuonna 2011 to-
teutettua informaatiokampanjaa. Tutkimus osoittaa, että informaatiokirjeen
ja hakulomakkeen saaminen postissa vaikutti merkittävästi tuen hakemisalt-
tiuteen.
Kolmannessa esseessä tutkimme työnantajien työkyvyttömyyseläkevakuu-
tusmaksujen vaikutusta työntekijöiden työkyvyttömyyseläkkeiden yleisyyteen.
Suomessa on käytössä maksuluokkamalli, jonka tulisi kasvattaa työnantajien
kannustimia ehkäistä työntekijöidensä terveysongelmia ennalta. Käyttämäm-
me empiirinen menetelmä sekä aineistomme tarkkuustaso mahdollistavat va-
kuutusmaksujen kausaalivaikutuksen tunnistamisen. Analyysimme perusteel-
la maksuluokkamalli ei toimi tavoitellulla tavalla työkyvyttömyyseläkkeiden
vähentämisessä.
Neljännessä esseessä käytämme teoriamallia tarkastellaksemme optimaa-
lista verojen ja tulonsiirtojen rakennetta köyhyyden vähentämiseen kehitty-
vissä maissa. Muokkaamme tavallista optimiveromallia ottamaan huomioon
kehittyvien maiden heikomman hallinnollisen kapasiteetin rajoittamalla vero-
instrumentit lineaarisiksi. Tutkimus osoittaa, että veromallin tavoitefunktion
vaihtaminen tyypillisestä hyvinvoinnin maksimoinnista kehitysmaiden tavoit-
teita paremmin kuvastavaan köyhyyden vähentämiseen vaikuttaa optimaali-
siin vero- ja tulonsiirtosääntöihin.
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Introduction
This doctoral thesis is a collection of four essays that look at various public
policies and their impacts on low-income and otherwise vulnerable individuals.
The first two essays study the take-up of income transfer programs targeted
at low-income individuals. The third essay studies the impact of employers’
insurance contributions on the prevalence of disability pensions among their
workers. The fourth essay uses a theoretical framework to provide optimal
tax and transfer rules for poverty reduction in developing countries. The
essays share the general aim of studying the effectiveness of public policies in
achieving their stated goals (e.g. income support, prevention of disabilities).
The essays contribute to the field of public economics. The theme of
the third essay additionally overlaps with labour economics, and the fourth
one with development economics. The first essay is single-authored by the
candidate, and the latter three are collaborations with one or more co-authors.
1 The take-up of social benefits
The public sectors of various countries offer an array of income transfer pro-
grams with various goals, such as providing income security in the face of
adverse life events or reducing poverty and inequality in the society. When
implementing such programs, policymakers must decide on several details: the
target population, the application process, the level of the benefit, and so on.
All these decisions matter for the program’s impact, but in addition to the di-
rect effect (for example, a narrow target group or low benefit level could result
in a small aggregate impact) they may also have unintended effects through
program participation. Formulating detailed and complex rules for social
benefit programs can create high costs for the target group to learn about
eligibility or to go through the application process. The literature studying
benefit take-up typically considers information, transaction, and stigma costs
(Currie, 2006), and recent research has additionally identified various psy-
1
chological costs in program participation (e.g. Bertrand, Mullainathan and
Shafir, 2006; Bhargava and Manoli, 2015). The balance of application costs
and the expected size of the monetary benefit can become negative for some
individuals, resulting in non-take-up.
It is indeed a wide-spread feature of means-tested social benefit programs
that some proportion of the targeted individuals do not apply for the bene-
fits they are entitled to. Currie’s (2006) and OECD’s (Hernanz, Malherbert
and Pellizzari, 2004) overviews show that take-up rates across countries and
programs can range from close to 100% to far below 50%. As suggested by
Bhargava and Manoli (2015), the non-take-up of benefits should be viewed as
a policy problem, which can be influenced by parameters chosen by the policy-
makers. It needs to be recognised that the details of program implementation
affect take-up costs and benefits, and consequently people’s willingness and
awareness to apply for benefits, which in turn affects the effectiveness of the
program in reaching its goal.
The first two essays provide two different perspectives to the issue of non-
take-up of social benefits. In the first essay, I characterise the take-up beha-
viour related to two benefits targeted at the poorest households in Finland:
housing allowance and social assistance. The detailed and varied analysis al-
lows me to characterise the overall importance of take-up costs for different
kinds of households, relative to the benefit size, and the resulting impact on
poverty alleviation. In the second essay, the focus is specifically on inform-
ation and transaction costs. We use the introduction phase of the Finnish
guarantee pension program and the related information campaign to illus-
trate how a simple information treatment impacted on the take-up rate of
vulnerable individuals outside the labour force.
The first essay, studying housing allowance and social assistance, contrib-
utes to the literature on benefit take-up firstly by providing a comprehensive
picture of welfare take-up in a static set-up, and secondly by taking income
dynamics into account. Take-up literature typically studies the static context,
but some researchers have suggested that the dynamics of the eligible house-
holds’ circumstances could also matter for take-up behaviour (e.g. Blundell,
Fry and Walker, 1988; Blank and Ruggles, 1996). Combining these two per-
spectives allows me to characterise take-up behaviour from various angles. I
provide several stylised facts on take-up, and show that the benefits reach the
main target population – households with long-term low incomes – whereas
those experiencing short-term low income are more often left out due to non-
2
take-up. Previous research on these particular benefits has studied take-up in
a more narrow static set-up, but not the income patterns over time (Bargain,
Immervoll and Viitamäki, 2012; Lyytikäinen, 2008). The results help to form
a comprehensive picture of take-up behaviour and the nature of take-up costs,
complementing the findings of Blank and Ruggles (1996), one of few studies
considering the dynamic aspect of take-up.
Households with more variable income might anticipate becoming ineligible
in the near future, which reduces the expected size of the benefit. For a short-
term need, then, the costs of take-up are more likely to remain higher than
the expected benefit. Households with short expected eligibility could for
example try to find other means to cope without claiming the benefit. This
is consistent with the standard economic hypothesis that eligible households
calculate expected benefits and weigh them against take-up costs.
For this study, I construct a unique dataset from various registers and sur-
veys of Statistics Finland as well as the Finnish Defence Forces. An important
feature of the data is that I link income information and other characterist-
ics over a longer time period to each annual data set in order to follow the
eligible population’s behaviour and experiences over a longer time window
than allowed by the static, annual, data. With these data, I use graphical
and statistical descriptive methods to portray take-up behaviour. In order
to estimate take-up rates, I use microsimulation methods to determine which
households are eligible for the benefits. I also study how the various simula-
tion choices affect the take-up estimates, thus contributing to the literature
using microsimulation methods as well as illustrating the robustness of the
results.
Although the findings are informative of take-up behaviour among the
population studied, part of the target population cannot be analysed with
existing data. Some groups excluded from the current analysis could poten-
tially have a lower propensity to take up or behave differently in the dynamic
set-up. As better data becomes available, it would be important to study the
take-up of these groups in a dynamic setting as well.
Whereas the first essay provides a wide view to the take-up behaviour of
Finnish welfare benefits, the second essay focuses specifically on information
and transaction costs in take-up. The context of this essay is the introduction
of an entirely new social benefit, the Finnish guarantee pension program in
2011, and the Social Insurance Institution’s (SII) campaign to raise aware-
ness of the program among the eligible population. While the campaign
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consisted of various kinds of tools, its main component that we study was the
directed mailing to part of the eligible population. The mailing consisted of a
short information letter and a pre-populated application form together with a
postage-paid return envelope, and was sent to those individuals the SII could
most easily and reliably recognise as eligibles: the recipients of a full national
pension. With our detailed data from the SII and Statistics Finland on all
pensioners, we can identify the rest of the eligible pool and compare how the
take-up behaviour of the recipients of the January 2011 mailing (treatment
group) compares to those who did not receive this particular mailing (the
control group). We provide both illustrative graphical and descriptive evi-
dence, as well as causal regression estimates, of the impact of this mailing on
take-up.
The overall take-up rate of the guarantee pension was very high: 93% of all
eligible pensioners had applied for it by the end of 2011. Nevertheless, we find
that the take-up rate as well as the speed of take-up of the January mailing
recipients and non-recipients differed significantly. Using our main regression
specification, we estimate the impact of the letter to be 33 percentage points,
causing the treatment group take-up rate to be more than 50% larger than
that of the control group. Our data set also contains several variables that
inform on the health status of the target individuals, which allows us to study
the impact of this kind of a simple information treatment on individuals with
varying health status. We find that pensioners with medical expenses for
severe or long-term illnesses do not react differently from those without such
medication, suggesting that deteriorated health itself does not reduce the
take-up effect of the mailing. Furthermore, severely ill pensioners who are
less likely to manage their financial issues by themselves, respond even more
strongly to the letter.
The essay’s contribution to the literature lies especially in that we study
individuals outside the labor force, namely the low-income elderly and dis-
ability pensioners. Earlier literature on take-up, and the literature on in-
formation provision, have mostly analysed groups with a tighter connection
to the labour market or education (e.g. Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos and
Sanbonmatsu 2012; Bhargava and Manoli 2015; Liebman and Luttmer 2015).
However, knowledge of how this kind of inexpensive and simple information
provision affects take-up among non-working individuals – many with poorer
health – is very relevant for practical policy making, as many social benefit
programs target benefits to such vulnerable individuals.
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2 Incentivising employers to reduce disability pen-
sion incidence
Whereas the previous two essays looked at income transfer programs that are
targeted to individuals with low incomes, the third one looks at a program that
provides income security in the face of a disability that prevents the individual
from working full-time or at all. Instead of studying the take-up behaviour
regarding disability pensions, the essay takes a different perspective on the
efficiency of disability policies: how well does the current policy encourage the
proactive prevention of such pensions. In many countries, disability benefit
costs have been rising over recent years, which creates a burden on public
budgets and pension systems. Work-disabling conditions are also a personal
tragedy to those who encounter them. This has prompted governments to
search for ways to curb the growth of expenses (OECD, 2010). Regarding this
health-based benefit, one channel is to try to improve the health of workers so
that disability benefits are needed less often. In this endeavour, in addition
to the workers themselves, employers can potentially play a role as well. For
example, they can take care of the working conditions of their workers, provide
part-time work to suit workers’ health needs, and so on.
However, since it is costly for the employers, they may invest too little
in such disability-preventing measures from the society’s point of view. In
Finland and the Netherlands, experience rating of disability insurance (DI)
premiums is used to increase employers’ incentives for such investment. In
experience rating systems, the employer’s insurance premium reacts to the
prevalence of disability benefit claims among its workforce: employers with a
high disability risk face higher insurance costs whereas employers with a low
disability risk pay lower insurance premiums. This system should ideally cause
employers’ incentives to be aligned closer to those of the society’s, encouraging
them to invest more in measures that reduce disabilities. In this essay, we
estimate what effect the experience rating system in DI has on the incidence
of sickness and disability in Finland.
To study the effect of experience rating, we take advantage of an institu-
tional feature that allows us to identify its impact from other confounding
effects. In Finland, a firm’s degree of experience rating depends on its size:
the smallest firms are not subject to experience rating at all, whereas the
largest firms are fully experience-rated. For firms in between, the degree of
experience rating increases from 0 to 1 with the firm’s size. These discontinu-
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ities (“kinks”) in the experience rating rule at the threshold values for small
and large firms allow us to use a regression kink design (Nielsen, Sørensen and
Taber, 2010; Card, Lee, Pei and Weber, 2015) to identify a causal effect from
experience rating. We also benefit from the availability of detailed register
data from the Finnish Centre for Pensions and Statistics Finland that cover
all private-sector firms and their employees over the period 2007–2013, as
well as worker sick leave periods and disability pensions, together with their
medical diagnoses.
Due to the rareness of experience rating in disability insurance across coun-
tries, there is not much previous research on its efficiency in this context, and
the existing evidence is inconclusive (Koning, 2009; van Sonsbeek and Gradus,
2013; Kyyrä and Tuomala, 2013; de Groot and Koning, 2016). The Finnish
institutional set-up, and our detailed data, allow us to contribute to under-
standing better the efficiency of incentives provided by experience rating in
the context of DI.
Our analysis suggests that experience rating does not help to reduce sick
leaves or disability benefit claims. Different sized firms have differential incen-
tives to prevent sickness and disability incidence, but we find no differences in
incidence rates between them. Using the regression kink analysis, we find no
evidence of the degree of experience rating having an impact on the incidence
of sick leave or disabilities. Our data also allow us to disaggregate the inflows
to different types of disability benefits, and also by medical condition, but the
results do not vary along these dimensions, either.
Thus, our analysis casts doubt on the efficiency of experience rating in
DI as a way to reduce disabilities. A possible explanation is that the current
design of the Finnish experience rating scheme is too complex for employers to
properly grasp the impact of disability incidence on their insurance premiums,
thus hindering their incentives to act proactively.
3 Optimal tax and transfer policies for poverty
reduction
The first three essays study individual public programs and their effectiveness
in reaching their goals. It is also important to consider the public sector
as a whole, incorporating taxes, transfers and other tools together in the
analysis. This is naturally very difficult to do empirically, but can be done
in a comprehensive manner using a theoretical framework. This exercise is
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relevant for developed economies as well, but in the fourth essay we take the
viewpoint of a developing country, where policymakers are often focused on
poverty alleviation but the administrative capacity of the public sector can
be more limited, and modify the framework accordingly.
The optimal taxation literature (in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971)) as-
sumes that the public sector is capable of implementing complex instruments
such as non-linear income taxes. Many of the results of this literature are
therefore not directly useful for policy recommendations in developing coun-
tries. We therefore study linear instead of nonlinear income taxes in our model
and also consider the administrative requirements that different instruments
impose on the public sector. For example, linear income taxation can be im-
plemented by combining a proportional income tax and a lump-sum transfer.
Such taxes can be withheld at source, which is administratively easier than to
realise a fully non-linear income tax schedule requiring the accounting of all
incomes over the course of the year from all sources. We study all of the most
relevant redistributive instruments from this perspective: income taxation,
income transfers, taxes and subsidies on commodities, and public provision of
public and private goods.
Another motivation for the focus on the developing country context is that
in such countries there is often an explicitly expressed goal to reduce poverty
and to distribute the fruits of economic growth more evenly, by the countries’
governments themselves as well as the wider development community. In fact,
one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) formulated by United Na-
tions in 2015 is simply “End poverty in all of its forms everywhere”. However,
standard optimal tax analyses typically assume that the government is instead
interested in well-being, modeled as the maximisation of a social welfare func-
tion which aggregates individual utilities in the society. We study how the
optimal tax rules are affected when the goal of poverty reduction is explicit
in the model.
We find that, compared to the welfare-maximising optimal linear income
tax, the poverty-minimising optimal tax formula includes additional pressure
towards lowering the marginal tax rate in order to boost earnings to reduce in-
come poverty. Our numerical simulations however show that this mechanism
is offset by the redistributive concerns, as the optimal tax rates are higher
under the poverty minimisation objective than under welfare maximisation.
We observe a more drastic result when studying commodity taxation: setting
poverty minimisation as the government’s objective changes completely the
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conditions under which uniform commodity taxation is optimal, as set out by
Deaton (1979). Under poverty minimisation, uniform commodity taxation is
unlikely to be ever optimal. In practice, however, the administrative difficul-
ties of differentiated commodity taxes should also be taken into account.
The findings complement earlier studies on optimal linear taxation (e.g.
Tuomala, 1985; Piketty and Saez, 2013) and on non-welfaristic objectives (e.g.
Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala, 1994; Pirttilä and Tuomala, 2004). The analysis
also illustrates how the theoretical framework can be modified to bring out
conclusions that are relevant to the policy context at hand.
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